Well, “Say it’s so!” The Chicago White Sox have won their first World Series in 88 years, their last one dating back to, remarkably, 1917. Winning the battle in every phase of the game, the White Sox dominantly swept the Houston Astros, who were making their very first World Series appearance in the 44-year history of the franchise. With all four games being close and exhilarating for the baseball fan, this year’s World Series turned out to be much better than last year’s Red Sox shelling of the Cardinals.

Congratulations aside: how, exactly, did a team that about a month ago was fighting for its playoff life suddenly sweep its way through the playoffs? One month ago, the White Sox were in the midst of losing 13 ½ games in the standings and seeing their once 15-game lead evaporate into a 1 ½ game advantage. They then proceeded to sweep the challenging Indians, who were three games back heading into the final weekend, to end the regular season, and roll through the playoffs with an 11-1 record.

How did they do this? One of the most common misconceptions about this Chicago White Sox championship team is their institution of “small-ball” offense and the wonders it has done for the team.

For one, the White Sox do employ some features of a small-ball type offensive attack, or at least they try. Scott Podsednik, their leadoff hitter, stole 59 bases during the regular season. Stealing bases in order to move into scoring position is a major part of small-ball. The White Sox as a team had the most stolen bases in the major leagues. They also failed the most number of times in attempting to swipe a base. Their estimated 65% stolen base rate is not nearly adequate to produce a major amount of runs. Baseball mathematicians have proven that in order to add a significant number of runs to an offense, a successful stolen base rate of 71-75% is needed. Chicago is well off that pace.

Yes, they bunt runners over, they steal, and they hit sacrifice flies. But what else does the White Sox offense major in? Home runs. Chicago was fourth in the American League and fifth in the ML in homers this year. So, when the White Sox were down 4-2 in Game 2 of the World Series, did Paul Konerko bunt a grand slam over the fence? When the team was down 4-2 in Game 2 of the ALDS, did Tadahito Iguchi mean to hit a sacrifice fly, and ended up hitting it over the fence for a 3-run homer? Or did they keep on bunting when they scored 14 runs in one game against the Red Sox in the ALDS? Did Scott Podsednik, a player known for his small-ball style, jet around the bases after a 9th inning, walk-off home run in Game 2 of the World Series?

What may shock you is that the White Sox actually declined in every major offensive category this season. That’s right. Declined. You name the stat; chances are they decreased in it from 2004 to this year.

Runs are the measure of an offense. After all, no matter how many home runs a team hits, hits a team records, or batting average it records, the bottom line is the number of runs it puts up on the scoreboard. The White Sox scored 741 runs this year, almost 125 less than the 865 they scored last year.

Chicago hit .268 last year. This year? .262. Their on-base percentage (OBP) dropped from .333 to .322. And their slugging percentage dropped from .457 to .425, which means their OPS (on-base plus slugging) declined almost 45 whole points, from .790 to .747.

Not only is it time to disregard the notion that “small-ball” is crucial to the success of an offense, it is also time to recognize the true reason of the White Sox’ success. Pitching. The White Sox went from 25th in the major leagues in 2004 in terms of ERA (4.91) to 4th in the ML, and 2nd in the AL in 2005 (3.61, a difference of 1.3 runs per nine innings). Their OPS-against went from .791 to .707, and their batting average-against dipped from .272 to .249. Their strikeout/walk rate jumped from 1.92 to 2.27. They allowed 57 fewer home runs in 2005 than 2004.

Do you really need any more stats to prove this point? How about the fact that White Sox pitchers pitched four straight complete games in the ALCS against the Angels, to give the team four straight wins and close out the series.

Before the playoffs, Oakland Athletics General Manager Billy Beane predicted that, in each series, “The team with the greatest amount of homers will win the series.” That foresight held true in 5 out of the 7 playoff series, with a sixth ending in a tie. The St. Louis Cardinals, who were involved in the tie, had a greater slugging percentage (another determination of power) than its opponent, the San Diego Padres, and swept the series 3-0. Is it really necessary, then, to employ a strategy that will lose a team a series six out of seven times?